North Korea Has Taught Us that War with Iraq Is Necessary

The recent revelation that North Korea is pursuing a nuclear weapons program illustrates why the United States, even at the risk of war, must make sure that Saddam Hussein does not acquire nuclear weapons.

The U.S. is unlikely to use military force in the near-term to stop North Korea from testing or deploying nuclear weapons. It will not do so because the Bush administration correctly understands that initiating war against Iraq and North Korea at the same time carries with it the risk of failure in one or the other theater of operations.

But even after a successful war against Iraq, the U.S. is unlikely to initiate a war against North Korea. Instead, the Bush administration, in a manner similar to the Clinton administration in 1994, will probably offer North Korea economic incentives, but in this instance not to prevent it from developing nuclear bombs but to coax it into not testing or deploying the ones it has perhaps already built.

Why would America turn to economic incentives rather than military coercion? Because an American war against North Korea would end in a devastated South Korea. According to a report in the Oct. 17 New York Times, "Every American administration that has considered military action against North Korea -- including the Clinton administration in 1994 -- has come to the same conclusion: it is virtually impossible without risking a second Korean war, and the destruction of Seoul, South Korea."

The Korea case shows it becomes almost impossible for the U.S. to contemplate the use of military force against a country with nuclear arms. Once Iraq has the capacity to deliver biological or chemical weapons, or has a deliverable nuclear capability, then a U.S. military attack to destroy those capabilities could result in the destruction of Tel Aviv, Kuwait City or Riyadh. And just as some 37,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Korea would be at grave risk in the event of a North Korean nuclear or bio-chemical attack, so too would tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region be at risk if Saddam had nuclear weapons to use during an American attack.

As a result, Saddam would not only be able to build up his nuclear forces with impunity, he (or, after him, one of his two sadistic sons) would be in a position to undertake a conventional attack on Kuwait while threatening to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or Israeli or Saudi civilian targets if America resisted and tried to save that country as it did in 1991.

It is sometimes suggested that Iraq would never dare use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against U.S. forces or friends for fear of suffering an utterly devastating American (or Israeli) nuclear counter-strike. If such deterrence can be expected to work against Iraq, then it should work against North Korea.

Yet, American officials have apparently concluded that they cannot use force to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities AND deter that country from obliterating Seoul by threatening to destroy North Korea as a functioning society. Why? One possible reason is the North Korean regime has demonstrated it has a callous disregard for its population. From the late-1990s through 2001, the North Korean government allowed its population to suffer a famine rather than seek foreign aid immediately. The result was the loss of perhaps 2.5 million North Korean lives. If the North Korean regime is willing to accept such losses rather than lose face or power as a consequence of opening itself to the outside world, American officials must conclude that it then may be willing to suffer the loss of additional millions in a war with America.

American officials face a similar situation with Iraq: they may not be able to deter Saddam Hussein by threatening to destroy the Iraqi population. His security forces have already killed thousands of Iraqis. Saddam also allowed thousands of Iraqi children to die during the 1990s as an indirect consequence of economic sanctions imposed by the international community to slow his development of weapons of mass destruction. Like the North Korean regime, Saddam is indifferent to the fate of his own people; therefore, American threats whose efficacy depend on a desire by the current Iraqi state to preserve Iraqi society will fall on deaf ears.

This raises two troubling questions for the U.S. If Saddam or his son were to acquire nuclear forces and threaten to use them if an attack on Kuwait were resisted, would a U.S. president risk the resulting deaths of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people resulting from the likely strikes and counter-strikes? Is Kuwaiti oil worth that risk?

President Bush cannot allow himself or his successors to be put in the position where those questions need to be asked and answered; therefore, it is necessary that Saddam's regime be destroyed as quickly as possible.

This article originally appeared in the News and Observer of Raleigh.