Durham, N.C. - President Richard Brodhead has sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce opposing a proposal to restrict foreign academic researchers' access to technology that is controlled by U.S. export regulations. The proposal to require academic institutions to obtain "deemed export" licenses for foreign researchers to use such equipment has drawn widespread objection from universities, industry and associations of research institutions.

They argue that the requirement to obtain licenses for such equipment -- which includes common laboratory instrumentation -- would be prohibitively onerous and expensive, both in monetary terms and in damage to the research enterprise.

"The greatest cost, by far, would be to our ability to attract the most talented scientists and engineers from around the world: to come to Duke, to come to other U.S. universities, and to come to America," wrote Brodhead in the June 22 letter. "Indeed, the central issue is a potential loss of America's economic competitiveness. We must consider carefully what those losses would be, and whether they are justified by any actual gains in security."

Brodhead cited statistics supporting the importance of foreign researchers, from a recent National Academies report Policy Implications of International Graduate Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United States. He noted that a large fraction of science and engineering doctorates are earned by foreign students, and that they constitute the majority of postdoctoral fellows in those fields. Many also remain in the U.S. to contribute substantially to the nation's science and technology base, wrote Brodhead. Duke's experience reflects that reality, he wrote.

"While they are at Duke, every one of our foreign-national students -- like every one of Duke's foreign-national postdoctoral fellows and faculty -- contributes to the research enterprise of this institution. Moreover, many of these students have continued to contribute to America's growth in science and technology after completing their studies here."

Any restrictions on these researchers would have significant deleterious consequences, wrote Brodhead.

"At Duke, as at any U.S. university, these students work and learn in an environment quite different from that of a for-profit business," he wrote. "The American system of higher education depends upon the free flow of ideas. We do not ask our students, postdoctoral fellows, or faculty to sign confidentiality agreements as a condition of enrollment or employment, and everyone here is free to publish and share the results of his or her research.. This paradigm has served America well, in terms of both higher education and the advancement of fundamental research."

While the Department of Homeland Security has recently relaxed visa restrictions on foreign researchers, "the proposed changes in deemed export policies would have the effect of undermining that response," wrote Brodhead.

A preliminary assessment of the impact of the proposed policy on Duke indicated it would require a separate office with two to four full-time staff, wrote Brodhead.

"Our very limited review already has identified several potential areas where, if the proposed changes were to take effect, all work by foreign nationals would have to be suspended, pending further review and possible licensing."

For example, he said, the university's Shared Materials Instrumentation Facility -- used by departments across the university -- would be severely impacted.

"In cases such as this, while U.S. citizens and permanent residents could freely use the technology required to conduct fundamental research at Duke, their fellow researchers (students, postdoctoral fellows, and faculty) would be prohibited, pending the results of a license review process. This prohibition would delay, and could even deny, researchers access to the resources they need," wrote Brodhead.

The prohibition would create a two-tier system of higher education and would "fundamentally change -- for the worse -- the nature of academic research and education in the United States."

It would not be feasible for prior approval to be sought for use of such equipment by foreign researchers, wrote Brodhead, "because it is the nature of fundamental research that one does not know where it will lead at the outset. Academic researchers may have months or years invested in a project when the need for restricted use technology suddenly arises. Projects cannot stand still while export reviews take place . . . . In short, research delayed often amounts, in practice, to research denied."

The resulting two-tiered system "would have a significant chilling effect on our efforts to recruit and retain the most talented foreign scientists and engineers," wrote Brodhead. "Students, postdoctoral fellows, and other academic researchers who had been granted admission to this country and this university, and had been allowed to begin their research and education activities here, would find themselves suddenly suspended from using key resources. Many would return home, and fewer would come in the future."

The result would be a loss of academic freedom, wrote Brodhead, and "we would be signaling to our students that the American university had become a very different place, one in which information may not be freely shared.

"It would also be a less diverse place. Today, our universities provide American students with some of their first -- and best -- opportunities for interacting with and learning from people from around the world. Their intellectual horizons are broadened, and relationships are formed that will last lifetimes."

The solution to managing access to sensitive equipment should lie in the screening process that prevents researchers who present a security risk from obtaining visas and coming to the United States, in the first place, wrote Brodhead.

According to Vice Provost for Research James Siedow, the university has already taken a firm stance on inappropriate proposals to limit foreign researchers' access to equipment.

"We've actually had to push back on some research contracts that had export control language in them that would have prevented foreign students from using equipment," Siedow said. "And we've been pretty successful so far."

Added Judith Dillon, director of Duke's Office of Research Support, "It's become more and more difficult as time has gone on for us to negotiate appropriate contracts for a research university, and the proposed deemed export policy would just be another blow to that whole process." Dillon said that Duke negotiators are developing a "siege mentality."