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Robert Keohane: Rebuild Iraq With Benchmarks, Not Timetables

Robert Keohane: Rebuild Iraq With Benchmarks, Not Timetables

The James B. Duke professor of political science says the UN Security Council must be involved in the transition to Iraqi self-rule

Topics for this story: Opinion
April 23, 2003 |
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Robert O. Keohane, who specializes in international institutions, is past president of the American Political Science Association.

 

Who is to govern Iraq now that the war is over? The military forces of the United States and Great Britain are now in charge, as they have to be immediately following a war. Indeed, they are obligated to provide security, food and medical care under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949, Articles 55, 56, 59).

But for the process to be legitimate, it must be transparent. That is, people throughout the world must be informed about definite plans for the gradual replacement of U.S. military rule with UN authority, and then for a transition toward Iraqi self-rule.

One might think that the answer is a set of timetables for the transition. However, it is not realistic to impose timetables because no one knows what the political and security situation will be in Iraq in six months, a year or two years. Furthermore, rigid timetables can produce perverse incentives, leading well-organized armed factions to resist compromise in the hopes that reduction in outside forces will enable them to seize a greater share of power.

What seem to be needed, therefore, are benchmarks rather than timetables. The occupying powers and the United Nations Security Council should jointly decide on and announce the criteria that have to be met before each phase of the transition can take place. As security becomes assured and relief operations can be managed successfully under the authority of the United Nations, the UN should play an increasingly large and visible role in operations. Also, and as soon as possible, the UN should be involved in decisions about which Iraqis are invited to participate in talks that decide how an interim authority is chosen.

This does not mean that the Security Council as a whole should involve itself in micro-managing the process, but that the Secretary-General and his representative should be authorized to participate fully, along with officials from the United States and the United Kingdom, in day-to-day political discussions and decisions. The Secretary-General should be fully involved in monitoring and reporting on the activities of the occupying powers to ensure transparency. Insofar as they act in responsible ways, the United States and United Kingdom will benefit from such monitoring because it will increase their credibility.

If benchmarks are established, with a monitoring process, the United Nations can begin to establish a structure of accountability in Iraq. Such a structure would first serve to hold the occupying powers responsible, but it would also be applied to the UN as it took on increasing responsibilities. It would form a template for future development of practices of accountability for the new Iraqi government.

Establishing a timetable for self-government implies rights, without any implications about responsibilities. By contrast, benchmarks for a transition could help signal to Iraqis two essential principles of democracy: the value of accountability and the awareness that the privilege of self-government carries responsibilities as well.

The transition to self-government in Iraq is likely to be long. The United Nations still holds supreme authority in Kosovo and in Bosnia, after four and eight years respectively. Bosnia is nominally sovereign while Kosovo is not; but in neither case has there yet been a full transition to self-rule. In Iraq as well as in the former Yugoslavia, institutions will have to be established that limit sovereignty, but that enable effective sovereignty to be gradually regained as local people demonstrate that they can provide security, welfare and a measure of justice.

These limitations on sovereignty will only be legitimate if they are perceived not as self-serving imperialism by the occupying powers, but as internationally authorized means by which Iraq can gradually become a self-governing country with a decent politics. For a long period of rule from outside to be acceptable, a transparent set of benchmarks, with a clear structure of accountability, is essential.

This article originally appeared in the editorial pages of the April 23 edition of the News and Observer.

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