On March 1, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected the United States' request to deploy 62,000 ground troops and 320 planes and helicopters in Turkey in preparation for a U.S.-led war against Iraq.

Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) had many reasons to reject the U.S. request. Roughly 90 percent of Turkey's population opposed what they saw as a war against a Muslim neighbor, a war that risked the wrath of a tyrant who possessed weapons of mass destruction and who had sworn to retaliate against those who assisted the United States. Turks remembered that in 1990-91, President Turgut Ozal, without popoular support, had taken the position of closing Iraq's oil pipeline through Turkey, allowing the U.S. to use the Incirlik air base for bombing Iraq, and forcing Iraq to contemplate the possibility of a second front. While Turkey subsequently received some assistance from the U.S. (congressional opposition prevented the government from honoring all of its commitments) as well as from foreign governments, this assistance in no way covered the costs resulting from the war.

More problematic was the influx of 500,000 Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq, the costs of which not only disrupted Turkey's economy (whose growth rate was reduced from 5 percent to 1 percent), but also complicated its internal attempts to cope with the Kurdish question.

Complicating matters in the current crisis is the fact that Germany and France, whose support will be critical in the European Union's (EU) decision regarding Turkey's accession to the EU in 2004, are opposed to U.S. policy in Iraq.

On the other hand, there were good reasons for Turkey to acquiesce to the U.S. request earlier this month. The United States since World War II has been Turkey's best and most important ally. It supported Turkey defense against the Soviet Union in 1946 and its accession to NATO in 1951-52. Where the EU had been lukewarm-to-cold toward Turkish efforts to deal with the Kurdish terrorist problems of the 1980s and 90s, the U.S. had been far more understanding of Turkey's problems, even helping the Turks catch Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the separatist and terrorist PKK.

The U.S. also had given strong support to Turkey's desire for accession to the EU, and been instrumental in facilitating assistance that helped to address Turkey's recent economic crises.

Moreover, the U.S., sensitive to Turkey's difficult financial situation, was prepared to provide it with a reported $6 billion in grants ($2 billion in military assistance, and $4 billion in economic assistance), the economic portion of which would leverage additional loans that would help the Turks withstand the affects of a war that would otherwise devastate its economy. The U.S. also had worked out with the Turkish government an understanding that would address Turkey's concerns for protecting its borders -- including the fear that an autonomous Kurdish entity, nurtured by UN funds over the last year and benefiting from a fragmented post-war Iraq, would seek independence and, threaten the integrity of the Turkish state.

Under these circumstances, the government of Prime Minister Abdullah Gul recommended parliamentary approval of the U.S.-Turkish agreement. Given the importance of the issue, however, and perhaps because key officials in the party were not fully aware of parliamentary rules, AKP did not enforce party discipline (AKP controlled 363 of the Grand National Assembly's 550 seats). While the vote in parliament was 264-250 to approve the deployment, 19 abstentions meant that an absolute majority (267) of the 533 delegates present had not approved, forcing the government to reject the U.S. request to use Turkish bases in a second front against Iraq. Among the factors that affected the votes of those who opposed their own party were antipathy for joining a war against an Islamic neighbor, particularly when not supported by the legitimacy of a U.N. Security Council vote; a sense that Iraq was cooperating with a weapons-destruction mandate; and resentment over U.S. pressure for a quick decision.

In the aftermath of the decision, a sobering reassessment of the real and potential costs to Turkey of not supporting U.S. efforts, coupled with a public statement by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff Generak Hilmi Ozkok (who had hitherto refused to offer any public comment on the crisis) that backed the parliament's reconsideration of the resolution, appeared to change the attitudes of some of those who had voted against the government's recommendation. On March 9, the election to parliament of the charismatic Recep Tayyip Erdogan paved the way for formation of a new AKP government and a reconsideration of the resolution.

Three interrelated factors will determine Turkey's next response to the U.S. request: 1) How soon Erdogan will form a new government; 2) the results of the UN Security Council vote on the U.S./UK/Spanish resolution that is expected later this week; and 3) satisfaction of Erdogan's desire for clarification of Turkey's role in shaping Iraq's future -- particularly its fears of an independent Kurdish state and its concern for the rights of Iraq's Turcoman population.

This opinion piece originally ran in the March 16 Durham Herald-Sun