Theodore Triebel is a visiting lecturer at the Sanford Institute of Public Policy.

It seems the final chapter of the Gulf War of 1991 is about to be written. The Iraqi regime can either comply with the terms laid down by the international community as agreed to by Iraq as a condition of the preservation of its sovereignty after its attempted conquest of Kuwait, or it will be forced to do so.

Those opposed to any use of force in these circumstances would circumscribe the issue by using characterizations such as "preemptive war." This word play conveniently overlooks the fact that the war was actually begun by Iraq's invasion of another country, and that war was not intended to end until Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire. Indeed, Mr. Hans Blix, the UN's chief inspector, reported to the Security Council on Friday that Iraq, once again, was not in full compliance.

Those opposed to forcing Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire agreement by characterizing such force as "bullying," would hope we conveniently forget the consequences that have frequently arisen from temperance toward dictators. While all dictators need not be attacked, those who harbor grandiose designs upon other states inevitably cause substantial problems. We have engaged in a policy of temperance for 12 years with Saddam Hussein, and without serious movement on his part, he cannot be appeased forever.

No doubt, war should be the last resort. But this does not mean one must always wait to be attacked (as Britain and France concluded, too late, in 1939). In view of 12 years of acts short of war--including extended diplomatic efforts, UN sanctions and inspections, UN Security Council resolutions, and no-fly zone enforcement'" at some point time must run out.

Those who say other states present threats are right. But no state is in the particular position of defiance of a cease-fire that Iraq is in. Those who say Iraq had nothing to do with terrorist attacks here and abroad might also be right. But, right or wrong, punishment for terrorist attacks is not the issue here. The issue remains whether Saddam sees it in his interest to comply with the terms of his cease-fire. Alas, it would appear this is not to be.

Those who object to the consequences of forcing such compliance, where war is the final resort underpinning the necessary resolve, opt for the ultimate and fearful consequences of irresolution instead. History should remind us that irresolution in the face of these particular and unfortunate circumstances neither buys nor substitutes for peace, despite well meaning efforts to make the contrary case for the short term.

When reasonable and persistent diplomacy fails, there must be a next, meaningful step. Yet neither dictators nor those who, however sincerely, counsel continuous vacillation when confronted by such menaces, ever seem to understand that. At some point time runs out. That time has almost come.

This article originally appeared in the March 11 (Raleigh) News and Observer.