Robert Keohane is James B. Duke professor of political science at Duke University

The failure of negotiations in the United Nations Security Council to produce a resolution authorizing force against Iraq represents a failure of diplomacy, notably by the US and France. Rehearsing their blunders, however, is unlikely to do much good. Instead, we should re-examine the institutional structure of the Security Council. Doing so reveals that the recent debacle is partly due to a lack of effective mechanisms for accountability.

The Security Council can authorize the use of force under Article 42 of the UN charter but it does not have any forces at its disposal. The charter provisions for UN military staff committee - articles 45-47 - have never been implemented. As a result, the UN can authorize the use of force but it is member states that actually use force and leaders of those states who decide how forces will be employed.

The result is that the Security Council inevitably writes a "blank check" for the member states enforcing its will. The Security Council has difficulty holding the great powers accountable for their actions. There are no systematic procedures for monitoring military activities authorized by the UN. There are no systematic procedures for the Security Council to interrogate leaders of the states employing force, or for modifying authorizations in light of such questioning. And the Security Council has no ability to punish powerful member states - which have veto powers - for exceeding the limits of UN authorization.

As a result, there was bound to be difficulty reaching agreement on UN authorization for the use of force against Iraq this year. Even if US leaders had been articulate, thoughtful and patient, suspicions would have been raised about what the US would do with an authorization.

Would it respect just war principles to minimize the damage that war would bring to civilians? Would it limit its goals to those authorized by the UN? After the war, would it use Iraqi resources for purposes agreed to by the UN, or would it put them to uses specifically designed to increase American power and reduce the economic cost of war to the US?

Even a US administration with a humble spirit would have been unable to make credible promises in answer to these questions. No institutional arrangements exist to do so. Such arrangements are needed before the next crisis of this sort occurs.

One way to solve this problem of credibility would be for the leader of a coalition, such as the US, to reach an explicit agreement with the Security Council before military action occurred. Under such an agreement, the coalition leader would specify the threats to world order that it was acting to combat - in the Iraqi case, the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction. It would specify the political objectives of its projected military campaign. It would then agree with the Security Council on the benchmarks that it - as the occupying power immediately after the war - would have to meet.

There could be a number of benchmarks. First, immediate postwar access to the whole country for UN inspectors. Second, acceptance of responsibility, including financial damages, for actions that violated the laws of war or the principles of just war. Third, compliance with all relevant international conventions, such as the Geneva Conventions. Fourth, acceptance of UN authority, after a very short time, over the economic resources of the conquered country. Fifth, acceptance of a rapid transition to a UN administration, with civil authority over the country, supported for as long as necessary by forces from the occupying powers.

These measures would be costly for any coalition leader. Why should the US, for instance, accept these constraints if it is to bear the principal costs of military action? The answer is that only by accepting constraints ex ante can a coalition leader make its own promises credible. Credible promises, in turn, are essential to induce other Security Council members to authorize the use of force.

Supporting the UN's authority to govern a conquered country helps to provide a certain degree of legitimacy after the fact, as in Kosovo. But ex post legitimacy is necessarily deficient. Genuine and full legitimacy requires prior authorization of action by the UN - or at least overwhelming support for action if a veto is exercised, for parochial reasons, by one or more permanent members.

To gain prior authorization, coalition leaders must be able to make credible promises. And for promises to be credible there has to be a structure of accountability. Before the next crisis occurs, UN members should work to create such a structure.

This article originally appeared in the March 31 [London] Financial Times